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To understand the First Amendment is to understand the process of abstraction. Nazis become political speakers, profit maximizing purveyors of sexually explicit material become proponents
of an alternative vision of social existence, glorifiers of sexual violence against women become advocates of a point of view, quiet
residential streets become public forums, and negligently false
harmful statements about private matters become part of a robust
debate about issues of public importance. Although abstraction is
an essential component of language, of law, and indeed of life itself, doctrinal and theoretical analyses of freedom of speech rely
especially heavily on techniques of abstraction. Justifiably wary of
allowing some decision makers to consider certain factors, the law
of the First Amendment mandates that some otherwise relevant
considerations, most obviously and most frequently the harmfulness, worthlessness or falseness of classes of utterances, be excluded from governmental decision making. Indeed, the very idea
of free speech, as an independent principle of law and of political
theory, necessitates some degree of abstraction. A principle of free
speech, according to which the mode of analysis shifts when an occurrence can be categorized as "speech," is incompatible with a
t Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan.
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principle of maximally contextual evaluation of all aspects of situations in which speech is present. Although the principle of free
speech concerns the expansion of knowledge, the law of free
speech, paradoxically, concerns limiting the knowledge of the free
speech decision maker.
Against this background stands a common understanding of
the work of Harry Kalven, who fifteen years after his death is best
thought of not as a commentator on the free speech tradition in
the United States, but as part of that tradition. This common understanding, reflected in the literature1 and emphasized in the editor's preface to this book,2 sees Kalven as a particularist, a devotee
of the case-specific methods of the common law, an opponent of
grand theory, and a scholar who saw the key to free speech adjudication not in large categories but in "thinking small."
Yet this understanding of Kalven is in tension with the idea of
free speech itself, for if we think in particularistic terms, we are at
a loss to explain not only why the Nazism of the Nazis and the
racism of the White Citizens League are irrelevant to their free
speech claims, but also why the non-particularistic category of
"speech" should warp an otherwise particularistic evaluation of the
permissibility of regulating certain types of behavior. Faced with
this tension, we might conclude that Kalven was simply mistaken.
Alternatively, however, we might conclude that it is just this interpretation of Kalven that is mistaken, and that his alleged particularism is but a minor gloss on an understanding of free speech that
emphasizes not only its categorial structure, but also emphasizes
the First Amendment's necessary avoidance of case-specific contextualism. With the publication of A Worthy Tradition, it now
seems clear that this latter interpretation is correct-Kalven's own
words demonstrate the extent to which he understood that the
central meaning of the First Amendment lies not in what we see,
but in what we ignore.3 In this respect, the First Amendment is as

See, for example, Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional
Interpretationand Negative FirstAmendment Theory, 34 UCLA L Rev 1405, 1407 (1987);
Kenneth L. Karst, The FirstAmendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on
the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 UCLA L Rev 1 (1965); Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation:Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw U L Rev 1212, 1215-16 (1983).
2 Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America xi-xxxii
(Harper and Row, Jamie Kalven, ed, 1988). All page numbers in textual parentheticals refer
to this book.
' Although I think it important to correct a misinterpretation of Kalven, my justification for emphasizing this theme lies largely in the extent to which an increasingly pervasive
perspective on the First Amendment parallels this misinterpretation. A focus on contextual-
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much in tension as in consonance with the common law method.
Even when the First Amendment "works itself pure," (pp xvii,
506)1 it remains essentially, importantly, and necessarily impure.
II
Although my goal in this essay is to see the work of Harry
Kalven through the lens of one perspective on a specific aspect of
ism, particularism, and case-specific common law method seems to be an increasingly important (but no less mistaken) way of looking at First Amendment issues. See, for example,
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L Rev 1615 (1987); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 Va L
Rev 1219 (1984); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Justice Harlanand the FirstAmendment, 2 Const Comm 425 (1985); Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and CorporateFreedom:
A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S Cal L Rev 1227 (1986);
Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25
UCLA L Rev 915 (1978); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L Rev 565 (1980);
Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the FirstAmendment, 72 Cornell L Rev 936 (1987). What
makes this much more than a typically epiphenomenal academic debate, however, is the
extent to which the position I describe has an increasingly influential judicial expositor in
the person of Justice Stevens. See, for example, Frisby v Schultz, 108 S Ct 2495, 2508 (1988)
(Stevens dissenting); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v Public Utilities Commission of California,
475 US 1, 35 (1986) (Stevens dissenting); Bethel School District No. 403 v Fraser,478 US
675, 691 (1986) (Stevens dissenting); Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 US 60, 80
(1983) (Stevens concurring); New York v Ferber,458 US 747, 777 (1982) (Stevens concurring); Schad v Mt. Ephraim, 452 US 61, 79 (1981) (Stevens concurring); Consol. Edison Co.
o Public Service Comm'n, 447 US 530, 544 (1980) (Stevens concurring); FCC v Pacifica
Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978); Young v American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 US 50 (1976)
(Stevens's plurality opinion). Addressing the issue thus has an immediate salience apart
from the general importance of understanding just what free speech is all about.
As with any dichotomy, my distinction between particularism and its opposition is both
oversimplified and exaggerated. Neither Justice Stevens nor his academic compatriots would
abjure entirely the need for some comparatively sticky categories. And neither I nor those
who sympathize with my perspective would deny either that First Amendment categories
are subject to change over time, or that the complexity of communicative contexts demands
some degree of subdivision within the doctrinal structure of the First Amendment. See
Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 S Ct Rev
285. Still, there are important differences between those who focus on case-specific context
and on the dangers of acontextual decision making and those of us who focus on the importance of abstraction and on the dangers of excess contextualization. Within First Amendment thinking this contrast is reflected in differing views about the size and plasticity of
First Amendment categories, but the contrast between a focus on this case and a focus on
larger and necessarily acontextual categories transcends anything specific to the First
Amendment. Compare Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution,72 Minn
L Rev 1331 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4 (1986); and Martha Minow, The Supreme
Court, 1986 Term-Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 Harv L Rev 10 (1987); with Frederick Schauer, Rules, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution,6 Const Comm (forthcoming, 1988); and Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509 (1988).
" See also Harry Kalven, Jr., Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U
Chi L Rev 235, 236 n 6 (1973).
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free speech theory, I should reemphasize the way in which I view
this important book. Were we to view Harry Kalven as a commentator on the American free speech tradition, this book, for all its
qualities, might appear rather dated, somewhat bloated, disturbingly thin in its use of the commentary of others, too reliant on the
emotive power of words like "censorship," excessively preoccupied
with Supreme Court opinions, and often not nearly as well written
as much of the rest of the Kalven oeuvre.
To view the book in this way, however, is to see Kalven as
external to the free speech tradition rather than as part of it. Yet
the latter view seems much closer to the truth, 5 and thus this book
should be seen more as a primary internal source than as a secondary external one. The justification for taking this tack is well supported by the record. It was Kalven who gave us the idea of the
"heckler's veto,"' who was instrumental in formulating the concept
of the public forum,7 and who played a major role in importing the
work of Alexander Meiklejohn into the consciousness of free
speech decision makers." At least from an academic's perspective,
Harry Kalven's celebration of New York Times Co. v Sullivan9 is
as much part of the free speech tradition in America as is New
York Times Co. v Sullivan itself.1 0
When we understand the importance of Harry Kalven to and
in the free speech tradition in the United States, we can receive
this book as a primary source within that tradition. When we do
so, we see that some of the flaws I mentioned are largely the products of a misconception of the role that this book plays. We do not
discount the importance of the Areopagitica because John Milton
was concerned only with prior restraint of non-Catholics, nor do we
discount the importance of On Liberty because few restrictions on
speech these days are premised on the falsity simpliciter of the
suppressed communications. Similarly, we should be willing to tolerate the fact that A Worthy Tradition is not a book that Harry

5 See Owen M. Fiss, Kalven's Way, 43 U Chi L Rev 4, 4 (1975).
' Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 140 (Ohio State, 1965).
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the PublicForum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S Ct Rev
1.
8 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment", 1964 S Ct Rev 191; Harry Kalven, Jr., Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn
and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U Chi L Rev 315 (1960).
9 376 US 254 (1964), celebrated in Kalven, 1964 S Ct Rev 191 (cited in note 8); Harry
Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967
S Ct Rev 267.
"0 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53
U Chi L Rev 782, 782-83 (1986).
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Kalven would have written in 1988. Indeed, as we consider the superficial obsolescence of much of a book written only fifteen years
ago, we can appreciate just how much the nature of First Amendment law and discourse has changed in such a comparatively short
time."
The impetus to read this book for all that it teaches us rather
than for all the flaws we can find in it is fully supported by all that
Harry Kalven was. 1 2 In a world in which ideas are targets rather
than opportunities, in which judicial opinions are the vehicles for
obloquy, and in which savagery rather than sympathy is the modus
vivendi,' 3 Harry Kalven stands apart. When Kalven admired an
opinion, he celebrated it, rather than worrying that in his celebration he would appear to his colleagues and others as insufficiently
rigorous and therefore insufficiently smart. When Kalven was critical of an opinion, or of a Justice, the criticism was elegant and
gentle rather than biting or sarcastic, often stressing the positive
even in what or whom he was criticizing.
This basically sympathetic academic personality is most apparent in this book's treatment of the free speech tradition in
America. What emerges over and over in this book is Kalven's
pleasure about where we were in 1974, his admiration of those who
helped us get there, and his anxiousness to emphasize the essential
marginality of even his own criticisms. The contrast between the
Supreme Court's decisions in Brandenburg v Ohio14 and Debs v
United States, 5 over the course of a mere fifty years, is far more
important to him than the obvious defects in the Brandenburg
1 Let us not forget just how concentrated is the history of a strong First Amendment.

In 1951 and 1952 the Supreme Court decided Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951),
and Beauharnaisv Illinois, 343 US 250 (1952). Shortly before these decisions, the Court was
not even asked to review the determination by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
that Erskine Caldwell's God's Little Acre was legally obscene. Attorney General v The Book
Named God's Little Acre, 326 Mass 281, 93 NE2d 819 (1950). Only twenty-five years later,
the Court had decided Va. State Bd. of Pharm.v Va. Cit. Cons. Council, 425 US 748 (1976);
Spence v Washington, 418 US 405 (1974), Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971); Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969) (per curiam); and New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US
254 (1964). A Worthy Tradition makes clear Kalven's joy in a development whose rapidity
he could see first hand, and the undeniably celebratory tone gives this book a great deal of
its charm.
121 never met Harry Kalven. Nevertheless, Kalven's personal qualities are as much a
part of the legal academic culture as are his scholarly writings, and there is also little doubt
that these qualities appear as much from his writing as they do from the tales of those who
knew him.
" See John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 Harv L Rev 693, 698 (1974),
noting the "savagery" of constitutional criticism.
1 395 US 444 (1969) (per curiam).
16 249 US 211 (1919).
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opinion itself. (pp 119-24, 227-36) The Court's failure directly to
confront the First Amendment issues in Sweezy v New Hampshire1 6 is part of a helpful political strategy rather than insufficient
sensitivity to First Amendment values. (pp 492-97) His disappointment with the 1973 obscenity cases does not lead him to quarrel
with the Court's attempt at a difficult political balance; instead, he
emphasizes the narrowness of the opportunity for censorship after
7
Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton1
and Miller v California.8 Indeed,
his very treatment of obscenity, commercial speech, libel, and contempt by publication as "minor jurisdictions of censorship" (pp 2173) is testimony to the importance Kalven saw in rejoicing in
where we have come rather than lamenting the comparatively trivial areas as to which he wishes we had gone further.
We best honor Harry Kalven, therefore, by reading this book
as he read the works of others-to learn rather than to poke holes,
to understand rather than to castigate, and to take the reading of a
text as an opportunity to enrich the reader rather than an occasion
on which to vilify the writer. And when we read this text in that
way, we emerge with a better understanding of our free speech tradition, an even greater admiration for Harry Kalven, and thanks
for the efforts that have made this book itself a new part of an old
tradition. 9
III
The tension between abstraction and contextualism, which is
present in First Amendment decision making in a particularly
acute form, pervades all of law and all of life. Any given item, object, or event is susceptible to multiple characterizations. As I sit
here at my word processor, I am, inter alia, 5 feet, eight inches tall,
male, caucasian, Jewish, a New York Yankee fan, balding, nonBulgarian, 43 years old, AB positive blood, not a member of a political party, faculty member at a national law school, skier, woodworker, member of the American Contract Bridge League and the
frequent flier programs of United and Northwest airlines, and 632
miles from Newark, New Jersey. Events as well as people and ob16 354 US 234 (1957).

413 US 49 (1973).
Is 413 US 15 (1973). See Kalven's discussion at pp 48-53. Note also p 59 ("There is, to
be sure, something to be said for this as a diplomatic solution to a political problem and
certainly the Court has done a great deal to narrow the scope of obscenity regulation. Hence
I am not disposed to fault its performance.")
19 The book was edited by Kalven's son, Jamie Kalven, with assistance from Owen Fiss.
The editorial process is engagingly described in an editor's afterword at pp 589-610.
17
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jects are also susceptible to such detailed description. For instance,
the event we might describe as a "Cubs game" could be particularized by providing the date, names of players, temperature, attendance, and brand of fertilizer used on the grass. Likewise, the event
the police officer describes as a "motor vehicle accident" is also,
and simultaneously, the event the lawyer calls a "tort," the physician a "trauma," and the automotive engineer a "failure in the
MacPherson strut."
Whenever we ascribe a property to an object or an event, we
group that object or event with some number of other objects or
events, and each ascription attached to some particular serves to
group that particular with an extensionally divergent array of
other particulars. To describe me as a Yankee fan groups me with
a different class than the class with which I am grouped as a skier,
and describing an event as a "Cubs game" is very different from
describing that same event as a "large gathering of people under
newly installed illumination." Although both descriptions are correct, each says something quite different.
Our minds are not large enough to refer to every object or
event within our ken with sufficiently detailed description such
that each is both fully described and differentiated from every
other object or event. Maximal particularization of description is,
thus, a practical impossibility, and we negotiate life by using truncated descriptions, in the process emphasizing the similarities between different particulars. When I describe your Duesenberg and
my Subaru as "cars," I have in the process suppressed some number of potentially relevant differences between the two vehicles.
Although abstractions like "car" suppress potentially relevant
differences, these suppressions are defeasible when they occur in
the normal process of conversation. When a given abstraction is
insufficient for the needs of the moment, or when that abstraction
turns out to suppress some feature that is relevant at the moment
("Will you take $5000 for that car?"), we can call up at the moment those temporarily suppressed particulars that are now
germane.
Abstraction becomes problematic when, and only when, the
abstraction is entrenched, resisting attempts to call up the particulars it has suppressed even when those particulars become relevant. At times this entrenchment may be psychological, as when
our familiarity with a single generalizing word such as "snow"
makes it more difficult to call up differences among the multiple
varieties of snow, a difficulty not present when a language, such as
that of the Inuit, has separate words for each type of snow. At
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other times entrenchment may be a function of the kinds of practices we find in a legal system, practices that make it systemically
impermissible for certain decision makers to call up certain particulars because a certain abstraction is written in canonical form and
accompanied by certain rules governing how that phenomenon of
canonicity is to be treated. In other words, some decisional environments may disable their decision makers from looking beyond,
behind, or beneath a canonically entrenched abstraction. An instruction to a police officer to "give a Miranda warning whenever
you arrest a suspect" potentially entrenches "arrest," making it
difficult if not impossible for that officer permissibly to draw even
those distinctions among different types of arrests that might seem
to that officer now to be relevant.
One of the defining features of the common law is its comparative lack of canonical entrenchment. When it turns out that some
abstraction of the past generates the wrong result in the case now
being considered, the common law has the ability to modify the
abstraction at the moment of application, applying the modified
abstraction rather than the previous abstraction to the case at
hand. When common law processes are at work, the phenomenon
of entrenchment is weakened; apparent abstractions are defeasible
should a case arise in which adherence to the abstraction would be
unfaithful to the goals of the system.20
In order for this process to make sense, however, there must
be some reason for saying that application of the previous abstraction to this new case is ill-advised. In other words, the common law
operates by reference to some justification or justifications lying
behind the specific abstractions of the law.2 When the result indicated by the abstraction diverges from the result indicated by direct application of these background justifications, then, subject to
presumptions and institutional constraints, the abstraction is modified so as better to reflect its background justifications. Theoretically, as this process continues, the occasions of divergence be'o This is hardly the place for an extended discussion of my views on the nature of the
common law. The reader interested in an elaboration of what I egregiously abbreviate in the
text should consult Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law? (Book Review), 76 Cal L
Rev (forthcoming, 1988), which owes much to Brian Simpson, The Common Law and
Legal Theory, in William Twining, ed, Legal Theory and Common Law 8 (Basil Blackwell,
1986).
21 The most extended discussions of the relationship between the common law process
and "non-legal" factors are Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard, 1977),
,Ronald M. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard, 1986), and Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Nature
of the Common Law (Harvard, 1988).
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tween abstraction and justification diminish. This process of
reducing the gap between what the abstractions (rules) indicate
and what direct application of the background justifications indicate is what Kalven saw as the law "working itself pure."
As should be apparent, much weight is borne in this process
by the background justifications. This is especially obvious once we
return to the First Amendment. What is it to say, as Kalven says
throughout A Worthy Tradition, that First Amendment doctrine
is developed in common law fashion? In part, it is to say that First
Amendment doctrines, principles, rules, and tests are all abstractions, designed to make legally and mentally manageable the application of the background rationale(s) for free speech to the diversity of communicative contexts. But when it turns out that
application of the abstraction produces a result at odds with the
result indicated by the underlying principles of the First Amendment, that divergence under a common law model would be an occasion for modifying the test, rule, principle, or standard constituting the abstraction. If we were proceeding in pure common law
fashion, therefore, we might expect First Amendment doctrine to
become ever finer, eventually yielding all and only the results indicated by direct application of the rationale or rationales undergirding the First Amendment.
IV
It should now be apparent that this account of the common
law only dimly explains either First Amendment doctrine or Harry
Kalven's understanding of it. A number of examples will make this
clear.
As I noted above, a central feature of A Worthy Tradition is
Kalven's celebration of the then recently decided case of Brandenburg v Ohio. But let us look more carefully at the particular facts
of Brandenburg,and at Kalven's discussion of them, in light of his
professed First Amendment rationale concerning seditious libel
(about which I will say more presently). 2 First, Kalven, as did the
Court, places emphasis on the fact that the statute in Brandenburg
was directed to the "problem" of syndicalism (which certainly
sounds in sedition more than anything else), despite the fact that
21 "In my view, the presence or absence in the law of the concept of seditious libel
defines the society. A society may or may not treat obscenity or contempt by publication as
legal offenses without altering its basic nature. If, however, it makes seditious libel an offense, it is not a free society, no matter what its other characteristics." (p 63; see also pp 9495, 228-38, 597-99)
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neither Brandenburg himself nor most other members of the Ku
Klux Klan look much like the typical revolutionary syndicalist who
inspired the fears of the Red Scare. Second, Brandenburg's speech,
while certainly urging changes in government policy, threatens violence not against government, but against "Jews" and "Niggers."
Thus, the protection of Brandenburg's speech involves at least two
levels of non-fact-specific abstraction. First, Brandenburg assimilates speech urging illegal action to speech urging a peaceful
change in government policy, in that sense suppressing a relevant
(even in light of a seditious libel rationale) distinction between
urging that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be repealed and urging
that members of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice be murdered. Second, even if the first abstraction is accepted, there might still under a seditious libel rationale be a distinction between urging revengeance against governmental officials
and urging revengeance against non-governmental "Jews and Niggers." Thus, Kalven's conception of Brandenburg,along with the
Court's conception, suppresses a number of facts that direct application of the "no seditious libel" rationale would have made relevant, possibly making the consequent rule more refined.
As Kalven urges, Brandenburgcannot be read apart from New
York Times Co. v Sullivan.2 s But as one of Kalven's students has
reminded us, it would have been possible to reach the result in
New York Times, a result commanded by direct application of the
seditious libel rationale, without engaging in the wholesale housecleaning of the common law that the Court's holding in New York
Times directed.24 The New York Times decision, by fashioning a
rule applicable to cases in which none of the dangers of a prosecution for seditious libel were themselves present,25 and by propelling
the Court on a path to protecting injurious speech in which the
dangers of seditious libel were even less present,2" hardly looks like
a monument to contextualism, particularism, or common law
method. On the contrary, New York Times Co. v Sullivan, along
with Brandenburg, looks like a case in which the Court seeks to
entrench a rule, making that rule at least somewhat resistant to
modification even with respect to cases in which the background
23

24
25
26

376 US 254 (1964).
Epstein, 53 U Chi L Rev 782 (cited in note 10).
See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v Damron, 401 US 295 (1971).
1 am thinking here of actions brought by public figures who have no direct or indirect

involvement with governmental policy, such as game show hosts and placekickers. See Frederick Schauer, Public Figures,25 Wm & Mary L Rev 905 (1984).
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rationale for the rule is not served.
This same theme of over-inclusive First Amendment rulemaking pervades this whole book, as it does many of Kalven's writings.
As early as 1960, Kalven was noting that the theory of free speech
was a defense of the real risks involved in allowing false doctrines
to circulate.27 In this book he applauds over-protection of speech
as the only alternative to under-protection, and thus quite properly identifies the underappreciated importance of the Supreme
Court's decision in Speiser v Randall.28 Kalven thus sees in the
Speiser Court's insistence on narrowly tailored First Amendment
rules a fundamental feature of a great deal of contemporary First
Amendment adjudication. But in the imperfect world that justifies
the holdings in Speiser, Smith v California,29 New York Times Co.
v Sullivan, and others of their ilk, over-inclusive First Amendment
rulemaking is accompanied by an under-inclusive accommodation
of legitimate state interests.
Yet notice again what is going on here. In Speiser, in Smith,
and so on, the law does not work itself pure, except insofar as the
ideal is itself a recognition of the foundational impurity of the very
idea of free speech. Recall that for Kalven, like many others, the
justifications for free speech are non-ultimate and non-deontological. Free speech is not for Kalven a good in itself or a component
of individual well-being.30 Rather, by focusing on the aversion to
seditious libel as the central meaning of the First Amendment,
Kalven sees the First Amendment, as did his friend Meiklejohn, as
fundamentally about popular decision making and about the distrust of governmental officials. Yet if these rationales lie behind
the idea of free speech, at least for Kalven, one would expect a
truly common law process to work itself pure in the sense of generating a series of rules, principles, tests, and doctrines that do not
disable government from regulating except when that regulation
would interfere with popular decision making, or would itself pose
the danger of overreaching by governmental officials. Yet consider
2, Harry Kalven, Jr., A Commemorative Case Note: Scopes v. State, 27 U Chi L Rev

505, 516 (1960).
28 357 US 513 (1958), discussed at pp 384-90, 532-41. Not all have ignored Speiser's

importance. See L. A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 S Ct
Rev 243, 247.
29 361 US 147 (1959).
so For examples of the opposing view, seeing free speech as being either an ultimate
good or consequentially related to personal self-fulfillment or self-realization, see, for example, Martin Redish, Freedom of Expression: A CriticalAnalysis (Michie, 1984); C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L Rev 964 (1978).
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in this regard the Skokie litigation.3 1 Restricting a march by the
Nazis would hardly have interfered with popular decision making,
nor does there seem to have been in this case an instance of the
self-protective practices of elected or appointed governmental officials. Those officials did take an action that would advance their
political credibility, but the action was hardly one in which the
popular will was being thwarted.
Thus, one sees in the Skokie litigation an available distinction
between Nazis and others, an equally available distinction between
speech designed to persuade and speech designed to assault, and a
decision made by the people rather than a decision designed to interfere with the people's wishes. If doctrinal development under
the free speech clause were merely an instance of common law decision making, one might expect to see some or all of these factors
treated as relevant, and new distinctions developed in order to
make relevant those factors, such as the ones just enumerated, that
had been suppressed by previous formulations. Yet we know that
this is not what happened. The particular events were abstracted
in numerous ways. Nazis became political speakers, a suburban
community populated by Holocaust survivors became a public forum, and popularly inspired restrictions became governmental censorship. The resolution of the controversy, therefore, stands not as
a monument to the ever-more-sensitive development of common
law doctrine, but instead as an embodiment of the way in which
the First Amendment operates precisely by the entrenchment of
categories whose breadth prevents the consideration of some number of relevant factors, and prevents the free speech decision
maker from "thinking small."
The same phenomenon of abstraction pervades some other examples that occupy much of A Worthy Tradition. Perhaps the
best example is that of the bar admission cases, which are dealt
with in a marvelous concluding chapter. (pp 548-87)32 Although
11National Socialist Party v Skokie, 434 US 1327 (1977) (Stevens, as Circuit Justice,
denying stay); National Socialist Party v Skokie, 432 US 43 (1977) (per curiam); Collin v
Smith, 578 F2d 1197 (7th Cir 1978), stay denied, 436 US 953, cert denied, 439 US 916
(1978).
32 As the last chapter in the book, it is the last that Harry Kalven ever wrote. It may
also be among the best things he ever wrote. Unlike some of the earlier chapters, which
seem from a 1988 vantage point to be a bit heavy on case description and in need of more
elaboration of insightful but brief summarizing analysis, the chapter on the bar admission
cases is a perfect example of pervasive analysis, sensitive reading of nuances in the cases,
sympathetic treatment of arguments with which Kalven is in the final analysis unsympathetic, and discovery of important themes that even most careful readers would not have
perceived. That the last essay Harry Kalven wrote was among the best things he ever wrote
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Kalven is sensitive to the importance of many of the distinctions
that Justice Harlan draws in these cases, and although he is
equally impatient with the simplicity of Black's literal absolutism,
(e.g., p 569) in the end he shares Black's instincts about the cases
and accepts that the greatest degree of First Amendment protection comes precisely from ignoring many of the contextual and
case-specific factors on which the Harlan view depends.
This same concern for transcending the particular case and
the particular context appears in numerous other places: In his
criticism of the result in American Communications Ass'n v
Douds33 for not being susceptible to "a limiting principle;" (p 338)
in the way in which he treats loyalty oaths as "disfavored," (p 366)
thus identifying a presumption attaching to all instances of a large
category, rather than evaluating each oath itself under conditions
in which neither presumptions nor related procedural devices skew
the maximally sensitive evaluation of all relevant factors; in his
clear concern that the difference between alien speech and speech
by citizens not be a basis for more free speech decisions than necessary; (pp 403-48) and, in a related discussion, his eagerness to
think about Kleindienst v Mandel 4 not as a case involving speech
by an alien, but as a case involving the much larger and more abstract class of speech that some American wants to hear. (p 445)
I will leave it to the reader to identify other examples of the
same phenomenon. It seems clear to me, however, that the very
talent we most admire in the work of Harry Kalven-his ability to
see in cases what eludes most of us-is the ability to abstract. It
takes no great insight to see in a case the facts of that case. The
insight is in seeing those facts as examples or instances of something larger. This book shows us repeatedly not only that Kalven
was a great abstracter of large themes from fact-specific cases, but
also that he understood, better than most, that the same process of
abstraction that guided his academic style was itself central to the
operation of the First Amendment.
V
If all of this is so obvious, then why has so much of the world,
including Jamie Kalven in the book's introduction, reached the opposite conclusion?
is a fitting memorial, and a wonderful inspiration for those of us who fear our best years
have already passed.
33 339 US 382 (1950), discussed at pp 323-39.
34 408 US 753 (1972).
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We can identify three reasons for seeing Kalven as a particularist. First, his views should be seen in contrast with the views of
Kalven's most relevant contemporary, Thomas Emerson. As the
very title of Emerson's masterwork-Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment 3 5-indicates, Emerson was a proponent of a
unified doctrinal strategy for dealing with First Amendment
problems. Kalven, by contrast, recognized, quite properly, that the
diversity of communicative contexts required at least some diversity in doctrinal approach, a diversity that stands in favorable contrast to the question begging that emerges from Emerson's attempts to put too much of a diverse phenomenon into too sparse a
doctrinal structure.
The comparison of Emerson and Kalven, however, is more intriguing than this. Recall, after all, that on questions of First
Amendment theory, as opposed to doctrine, it was Kalven who had
the unified theory, the aversion to seditious libel, and Emerson
who recognized that the First Amendment served diverse goals relating to the attainment of truth, participation in democratic decision making, individual self-fulfillment, and striking a balance between societal stability and societal change.36 Kalven, it is true,
recognized that the force of the focus on seditious libel waned as
the issues moved away from the center of the First Amendment.
But, by contrast not only to Emerson but to those contemporary
scholars who have emphasized the multivalued nature of the roots
of the First Amendment,3 7 Kalven appears at first glance to be an
adherent and not an opponent of the single grand theory.
It is important, however, to distinguish unity of theory from
unity in the doctrinal apparatus necessary to support a theory.
Here, unlike Emerson and his contemporary followers, Kalven represents the view that the First Amendment needs multiple tests,
rules, and principles to support even a single-valued theory as that
theory confronts the diversity of communicative experiences and
the diversity of governmental interests. In this respect, Kalven did
recognize the importance of some degree of doctrinal subdivision
within the First Amendment, and, consequently, he is properly
characterized as a particularist, at least when compared to Emer-

31 72 Yale L J 877 (1963), expanded into The System of Freedom of Expression (Random House, 1970).
36 72 Yale L J at 878-86.
37 I include myself. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A PhilosophicalEnquiry (Cambridge, 1982). See also Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am Bar Found Res J 645;
Shiffrin, 25 UCLA L Rev 915 (cited at note 3).
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son and others who continue to think that one analytical approach
can encompass all that is important in First Amendment decision
making.
The second reason for viewing Kalven as a particularist is that
he recognized that the law of the First Amendment was developing, and that the best insights on which to base that development
came from the crucible of experience. He thus subscribed enthusiastically to the methods of the common law, and to the common
law's willingness to change its rules in the process of application.
He recognized that common law rules could become obsolete or appear ill chosen in the light of previously unanticipated situations.
But in order for this process to work, a wider range of factors must
be evaluated in the individual case than would be recognized by
the previously extant rule. Were it otherwise, the common law
would have no way of developing. By seeing the law of the First
Amendment as continuously subject to revision, Kalven is committed to judicial recognition of the potential for revision in every
case. 8 Consequently, by being committed to allowing the judge in
the particular case to consider the possibility that the rules should
be changed, Kalven was also committed to allowing that judge to
comprehend a range of factors far wider than those recognized by
the previously extant rule. Although the comparative entrenchment of categories impedes an ultimately contextual view of the
First Amendment, anything short of permanent and conclusive entrenchment must permit the judge in every case to perceive all of
those factors that might in the rare case lead to modification of the
entrenched category.
Finally, and most plainly apparent in this book, Kalven's particularism emerges as a particular strategy for dealing with a particular doctrinal problem. During the time he was writing, Kalven
was troubled by the categorial evaluation of governmental interests, a problem that persists to this day." He saw in the Court an
excess willingness to assume the validity of the governmental interest in a particular case because of the validity in general of governmental interests of that type. Over and over again, in stressing the
importance of Speiser v Randall, in insisting that government restrict speech only with the finest tools it had available, and in obSee Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J Legal Stud 351 (1973).
This is most apparent and most egregious in the Court's seeming "all bets are off"
approach to invocations of war, defense, national security, and the military. See Goldman v
Weinberger,475 US 503 (1986); Rostker v Goldberg, 453 US 57 (1981); Haig v Agee, 453 US
280 (1981).
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jecting to the waste of First Amendment resources when the Court
countenanced more restriction than was necessary, Kalven wanted
particular evaluation of the governmental interest involved right
here, and for him the fact that a governmental interest fell within
a category of generally valid governmental interests was
insufficient.
In all these respects, his tolerance of doctrinal complexity, his
adherence to common law method, and his insistence on a particular evaluation of governmental interests, Kalven properly recognized the nature and limits of thinking about the First Amendment in terms of types, of classes, or of categories. From this
perspective, the charge of particularism sticks. Yet, as the previous
section makes clear, to extrapolate from Kalven the recognizer of
the importance of a focused particularism to Kalven the thoroughgoing particularist misses the point both of Kalven and of the First
Amendment itself.
VI
The tension between Kalven's particularism and his aversion
to particularism can be reconciled in two ways. First, he appears to
have recognized, as do most careful thinkers, that it is possible to
have too much of a good thing. Just as the joy of chocolate must
yield to the dangers of an all-chocolate diet, and just as A Worthy
Tradition would never have been written had Harry Kalven attended every Cubs game, so too are the advantages of particularism in conflict with the advantages that come from looking at cases
as members of categories rather than in their fullest individual detail. Kalven recognized that both the particular and the general
have their place in a proper conception of the First Amendment.
Just as it is a mistake to see him as a proponent of the most acontextual and general approach to First Amendment issues, so too is
it a mistake to see him as an increasingly particular particularist.
He recognized the importance of both of these competing dimensions, and the careful reader will find in this book the constant
interplay between these opposing perspectives.
More significantly, however, Kalven must be read as someone
who recognized that the very idea of the First Amendment is itself
rule based. Were courts to engage in a completely particularistic
evaluation of every governmental act, the category "speech" would
be an intrusion, warping the most morally and politically sensitive
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of all relevant factors.4 ° But as long as the appearance of a
type-speech-changes the otherwise applicable methods of analysis, particularism runs into limits. Conversely, if the appearance of
the type does not influence the otherwise applicable method of
analysis, then free speech as a principle ceases to exist, with freedom of speech being but the incidental product of a method of
analysis in which the presence of speech has no effect on the
process. Kalven recognized that a commitment to free speech as
profound as his entailed a commitment to a categorial and rule
based approach to the world. His particularism, therefore, has
built-in limits, for Kalven was a (partial) particularist in his design
of what is necessarily a non-particularistic institution.
To embrace the idea that free speech is necessarily acontextual is not eo ipso to reject contextualism. Powerful arguments
have been made, primarily but not exclusively from the perspective of a feminist jurisprudence, that law's traditional aversion to
contextualism is contingent and not inexorable, and that it involves political and psychological presuppositions that ought to be
exposed to more critical analysis.4 ' Many of these arguments can
be said to represent, when applied to constitutional questions, a
rejection of a traditional Hobbesian view of the courts in general
and the Supreme Court in particular. That is, the aversion to con" Consider, for example, the model urged in Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 Suffolk U L Rev 1 (1986). I am sympathetic with Judge Posner's
reluctance to assume that any increase in freedom to speak is eo ipso an unqualified human
good, but it is important to note the way in which his modified Dennis formula remains a
sophisticated form of particularism, focusing on a balance between the costs of this regulation and the costs if this speech is allowed to remain unregulated. Id at 8-9. It is not clear
what role the thisness of this speech plays in Posner's scheme. If in the evaluation of the
cost of a particular speech, or the cost of a particular regulation, no special decision rules
(presumptions, shifting of burden of proof, etc.) come into play because this is a speech
rather than some other activity sought to be regulated, then it turns out that there is no
principle of free speech, even though it may turn out that there is a great deal of freedom to
speak. By contrast, if the nature of the analysis changes because the regulation is a regulation of a communicative act rather than of something else, and if that shift in analytical
method does not turn on a weighing of the costs and benefits of this speech and this regulation, then the presence of a communicative act simpliciter does make a difference, and a
principle (or rule) of free speech does indeed exist. If, as I read him, Judge Posner would
avoid these kinds of categorial presumptions (about the category "speech," not necessarily
about subcategories within that category), then the presence of a special protection of freedom of speech in the Constitution seems to serve no purpose. But if, by contrast, the presence of speech does serve to distort what would otherwise be the optimal weighing of the
respective costs, the free speech clause makes a difference. My reading of Posner as this sort
of sophisticated particularist is consistent with that in Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech,
Constitutionalism,Collective Choice, 56 U Cin L Rev 1317, 1328-34 (1988).
41 Although the literature is large and diverse, I have been most influenced by Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Harvard, 1987).
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textualism is the aversion to allowing certain decision makers to
take certain factors into account. Thus, the willingness to withdraw from decision maker A the ability to consider potentially relevant factor x because of a fear of abuse is a manifestation of a
distrust of decision maker A. With a decrease in distrust comes an
increase in particularism, for a decrease in distrust generates a
commensurate decrease in the strength of the justification for
prohibiting the relevant decision maker to take into account anything that might, in the circumstances, be relevant.
Against all of this stands a nagging First Amendment. For
however good it might be to speak and to allow others to speak,
the principle of the First Amendment remains a principle of distrust, an embodiment of a Hobbesian view of the world. Why
would the "slippery slope" and its associated metaphors figure so
prominently in free speech discourse were not there some specially
close relationship between a theory of free speech and a theory of
governmental and judicial distrust? Perhaps this distrust is unjustified, and perhaps it is appropriate to think not about how government might abuse its power, but about how it might use that
power for good. Yet under this outlook the very idea of free speech
is anomalous. Conversely, and as Harry Kalven clearly recognized
in this marvelous book, our commitment to free speech stands as
the best evidence we have of the perils of an unalloyed
particularism.

